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Correspondence: The Stuff of
Constitutional Law
Neal E. Devins*
Are decisions of the United States Supreme Court "the 'stuff of
constitutionallaw?" 1 Authors of constitutional law casebooks seem to think
so. Their books, in the words of Henry Monaghan, are organized around
the "widely held and deep belief' that the study of constitutional law should
be undertaken "through a detailed examination of Supreme Court decisions, albeit supplemented in varying degrees by authors' questions and law
review excerpts." 2 Monaghan's observation is fifteen years old, but the
conformity in constitutional law texts persists. This placidity is rooted in the
most basic premise of constitutional law instruction: "The Court is the
ultimate arbiter of the Constitution."3 As a result, constitutional truth
derives solely from the examination of Supreme Court opinions.
It is also true that the traditional case and academic commentary
model, while hardly shaken, is now under fire. A spate of supplemental
works in constitutional history, theory, and politics, designed to fill gaps in
the traditional casebook, have been published in the past few years. 4 Several
recent articles have also attacked the traditional model as incomplete and
dangerous. 5 One of these attacks, Professors Thomas Baker and James
Viator's Not Another Constitutional Law Course: A Proposal to Teach a Course on
the Constitution, 6 recently appeared on the pages of this journal.
Baker and Viator's piece is part complaint and part solution. The
complaint is that the teaching of constitutional law focuses too much on the
*Associate Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary; A.B.
Georgetown, 1978; J.D. Vanderbilt, 1982. Thanks to Erwin Chemerinsky, Lou Fisher, Barry
Friedman, John Garvey, Mike Gerhardt, and Jarrell Wright for commenting on an earlier
draft of this correspondence. All errors are my own.
1. Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Law Casebooks: A View from the Podium, 79 Mich.
L. Rev. 1020, 1021 (1981).
2. Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1977) (reviewing Paul
Brest, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials (1975)).
3. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
4. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, A History of the American Constitution
(1990); Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (1992);John H.
Garvey & T. Alexander Alienikoff, Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader (2d ed. 1989);
John H. Garvey & Frederick F. Schauer, The First Amendment: A Reader (1992); Michael].
Gerhardt & Thomas D. Rowe, Constitutional Theory: Arguments and Perspectives (1992); H.
Jefferson Powell, Languages of Power: A Sourcebook of Early American Constitutional
History (1991).
5. See Thomas E. Baker & James E. Viator, Not Another Constitutional lAw Course: A
Proposal to Teach a Course on the CtmStitution, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 739 (1991); Louis Fisher, The
Curious Belief in judicial Supremacy, 25 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 85 (1991); W. Michael Reisman,
International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law, 10
Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 8 n.13 (1984); Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Constitutional Education, 1987
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1023 (1987).
6. Baker & Viator, supra note 5.
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reading of cases and too little on to the reading of historical materials that
shed light on the framers' intentions. 7 For Baker and Viator, "[t]o surrender to this tendency and begin in 1803" with Marbury v. Madison is to ignore
John Marshall's most important admonition "that 'we must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding."'8 Their solution, however, is not
to restructure the constitutional law course. Instead, Baker and Viator
propose a set of lesson plans for a "three hour elective" in constitutional
history. 9
Baker and Viator's premise is that constitutional interpretation should
not be confined to Supreme Court decisions and related commentary by
legal academics. In many respects, it parallels former Attorney General
Edwin Meese III's contention "that '[h]owever the Court may interpret the
provisions of the Constitution, it is still the Constitution which is the law and
not the decision of the Court."' 10 Meese's distinction between the Constitution and constitutional law caused a firestorm by openly challenging the
most basic premise of constitutional instruction. 11 Baker and Viator launch
an identical challenge. They claim that, by failing to treat the framers'
intentions as the first building blocks of constitutional law, the course is
"upside-down, pedagogically as well as chronologically."I2
Baker and Viator correctly criticize constitutional law casebooks.
Constitutional decisionmaking cannot be traced solely to the efforts of nine
Justices working in isolation. Other parts of government regularly interpret
the Constitution and influence the judiciary. The fundamental role played
by the elected branches in shaping constitutional values, however, is given
little recognition in constitutional law texts. 13 Constitutional decisionmaking is also influenced by history, empirical study, policy analysis and
editorial commentary. These sources help shape constitutional debate both
7. Id. at 740 ("while reading cases is necessary, it is not enough.").
8. Id. at 742 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819)). David
Bryden and former Assistant Attorney General Wm. Bradford Reynolds, on separate
occasions, have also emphasized that the constitutional law course should take "our constitutional heritage" into account. David P. Bryden, Teaching Constitutional Law: Homage to Clio,
1 Canst. Commentary 131, 131 (1984); Reynolds, supra note 5, at 1030-31.
9. Baker & Viator, supra note 5, at 746, 747-61. At the same time, Baker and Viator
indicate that Jaw schools should make mandatory a course in constitutional history. Id. at 742.
10. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979, 983 (1987)
(quoting 3 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 470-71 (1923)).
11. Laurence Tribe warned that Meese's position "represents a grave threat to the rule of
Jaw ••. ," Stuart Taylor, Jr., Liberties Union Denounces Meese, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1986, at
A17. Michael Kinsley called Meese's speech a ·~urisprudential stink bomb." Michael Kinsley,
Meese's Stink Bomb, Wash. Post, October 29, 1986, at A19. Anthony Lewis said Meese's
position was an invitation to anarchy. Anthony Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1986, at A23.
12. Baker & Viator, supra note 5, at 742.
13. Leading constitutional texts make occasional reference to political events surrounding
landmark Court decisions. These references, however, are sporadic at best. Moreover, none of
the leading constitutional texts make use of "notes and questions" materials to prod law
students to think about the role of elected government in the shaping of constitutional values.
One notable exception-although its principal audience is political science students-is Louis
Fisher's American Constitutional Law. See generally Louis Fisher, American Constitutional Law
(1990).
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inside and outside the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, constitutional law
texts omit virtually any reference to outside materials not written by legal
academics. 14
Baker and Viator are on solid ground in condemning existing casebooks for giving "short shrift to the political and intellectual history of the
framers and their document." 15 Their criticism, however, is too limited in
scope. The constitutional law course is in need of much more than a shot of
constitutional history. Likewise, a three hour <:aRstitutional history elective
will do little to remedy pervasive problems in the required constitutional
law course. The solution to the inadequacies of the constitutional law course
is not the creation of specialized electives. The solution is to change the
constitutional law course itself.
Such changes cannot occur unless casebook authors extend the
traditional case and academic commentary model to include substantial
excerpts from constitutional politics, empirical studies, policy analyses, and
editorial commentary. 16 This extension will make teaching materials more
accurate, more useful, and more interesting.
MORE ACCURATE. Most landmark Supreme Court decisions cannot be
understood without paying attention to the politics surrounding them. 17
First, Justices pay attention to politics in crafting their decisions. John
Marshall's sequencing of merits and jurisdiction in Marbury v. Madison and
Earl Warren's efforts at crafting a unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education were both preemptive strikes designed to limit the political

14. Casebooks, of course, contain some references to the works of individuals in related
disciplines. These references, however, are the exception and not the rule. My observation,
moreover, should not be construed to suggest that nonlegal policy analysis and commentary
is somehow superior to the work of legal academics. My point is simply that casebooks
undervalue important and pertinent work not written by legal academics.
15. Baker & Viator, supra note 5, at 741.
16. The inclusion of material detailing the framers' intent on an issue before the Coun
would also be of value. Contrary to Baker and Viator's suggestion, such material should not
become the focal point of the constitutional law course. First, there is reason to doubt that the
framers' themselves perceived that their intentions should govern constitutional decisionmaking. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
885,903-04 (1985). Cf. Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent the View of the Framers', and the
Role of the Ratifiers, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 507, 516 (1988) ("history does not suppon the position
... that the framers and ratifiers did not intend the judiciary to look at original intent.")
Second, the framers' intent on a particular issue is typically opaque or nonexistent. See Paul
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204 (1980).
Cf Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226, 252 {1988) ("The very breadth of this
claim makes it implausible. It is essentially an attack on the possibility and validity of historical
investigation."). Third, constitutional decisionmakers infrequently rely on the framers' intent.
Consequently, irrespective of the accuracy or propriety of such analysis, law students would be
poorly served by a constitutional law course that discounts the ways constitutional decisionmakers actually resolve constitutional disputes.
17. Lou Fisher and I have written a ·collection of twenty-two studies of the politics
surrounding landmark Coun decisions. See generally Fisher & Devins, supra note 4. The cases
referred to in this Correspondence, for the most pan, come from that collection. Consequently, rather than clutter this Correspondence with detailed footnote suppon, I have chosen
to simply refer to those case studies.
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repercussions of unpopular decisions. 18 Second, politics is informative in
assessing Supreme Court doctrine. Legislation limiting the impact of Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority speaks to whether, as the Court
held in Garcia, states' rights concerns are adequately represented in
Congress. 19 Analysis of the decision to defer to military decisionmaking in
Korematsu v. United States should take into account that the internment of
Japanese-Americans was a subterfuge perpetuated by the military and
approved by the Justice Department.2° Third, political judgments shape
Court doctrine. Congress' choice to ground the public accommodations
section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the Commerce Clause as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment allowed the Court to treat Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States and Katzenbach v. McClung as commerce cases.2 1 Likewise,
amendments to the 1987 Ethics in Government Act proved critical to
Morrison v. Olson by expanding Justice Department authority in independent counsel investigations. 22 Fourth, politics contributes to the ultimate
meaning of Court action. The institutional dynamics that made the
legislative veto so popular before l.N.S. v. Chadha explain why the device
continues to be used, with well over two hundred legislative vetoes put into
place in the past decade. 23 The limits of Brown Irs delegation of remedial
authority to Southern district court judges are underscored by mid-sixties
elected branch action which resulted in more desegregation in 1965 than in
the decade following Brown.24 And, fifth, once the Supreme Court has
decided a case, a "constitutional dialogue" takes place between the Court
and elected government, often resulting in a decision more to the liking of
political actors. Congress ultimately persevered in challenging the Court's
1918 rejection of the Commerce Clause as the basis for child labor
legislation. 25 Executive and legislative action to express disapproval of Roe
v. Wade through funding restrictions were approved by the' Court in both
Harris v. McRae and Rust v. Sullivan.26
Congress, the White House, government agencies, and the states all
play critical interdependent roles in ,interpreting Supreme Cour~ decisions
and the Constitution itself. The sweep and influence of these interpretations are broad and pervasive. 27 By giving short shrift to these interpretations, as well as to the interactions between elected government and the
courts, constitutional law texts omit information critical to an understand18. Fisher & Devins, supra note 4, at 27-38 (Marbury); 261-83 (Brown).
19. Id. at 107-20.
20. Id. at 245-61.
21. Id. at 98-107.
22. Id. at 142-60.
23. Id. at 141-42.
24. Id. at 261-83.
25. Id. at 78-85.
26. Id. at 212-32.
27. Constitutional decisionmaking is not simply politics. Politicians and judges are often
governed by principles of decisionmaking as well as stare decisis. See Michael]. Gerhardt, The
Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68
(1991). My contention is simply that political actors play a significant role in shaping
constitutional values.
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ing of both the shaping of constitutional values and Supreme Court
decisionmaking.
MORE USEFUL. The practice of constitutional law must take into account
that constitutional decisionmaking is the province of the elected branches as
well as the judiciary. Therefore, good attorneys must be able to advance
their interests in both sectors. Sometimes the courts will prove most
responsive to a constitutional claim, but on many occasions constitutional
claims are more effectively advanced outside of court. A~ a result, constitutional advocacy cannot be limited to arguments grounded in-often
unhelpful-Supreme Court decisions. Rather, an advocate must also be
prepared to advance claims before legislative committees and administrative agencies. Moreover, even in court, especially the Supreme Court, an
advocate must be prepared to advance arguments rooted in policy as well as
precedent.
The pivotal role played by nonjudicial actors is especially apparent
today. The rulings of the Rehnquist Court increasingly defer to elected
government decisions. Federal agency interpretations of often vague
statutory language are likely to be upheld because substantial deference is
accorded to the interpretation of the authorizing statute by the agency
authorized with administering it. 28 State action is also subject to less
stringent inquiry, for the Court now appears unwilling to strike down "a
neutral, generally applicable regulatory law" irrespective of its effects on
individual rights. 2 9 Indeed, for many interest groups, the focus of constitutional advocacy has shifted from the courts to the executive branch and
legislature. The National Abortion Rights Action League recently informed
its membership that "[c]learly Congress is our Court of Last Resort. All
hope of protecting our constitutional right to choose depends upon our
elected representatives in Congress responding to the will of the American
people."30
Effective constitutional advocacy therefore encompasses familiarity
with the manner in which elected government resolves constitutional
disputes and an awareness of how to help government officials equate good
constitutional decisionmaking with sound public policy. Exposure to empirical study, policy analysis, and editorial commentary, in addition to
arguments rooted in constitutional theory and history, can be helpful.
While the Court may defer to the military's judgment to exclude women
from combat, empirical evidence on the changing nature of warfare may
well convince Congress to nullify such restrictions. 31 Likewise, the Supreme
Court is unlikely to expand the list of suspect classes to include sexual
orientation, but studies suggesting that the brain dictates sexuality may well
28. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
29. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513,2518 (1991) (speech); Employment Div.,
Dep't of Hum. Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990) (religion).
30. NARAL, Supreme Court Alert (June 27, 1991), quoted in Fisher & Devins, supra note
4, at 7.
31. Fisher & Devins, supra note 4, at 283-302.
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prompt the adoption of antidiscrimination measures. 32 The channeling of
such empirical evidence into effective arguments is often bolstered by
reading policy analyses and editorial commentary. By marshalling facts,
history, and values to advance a policy argument, these materials often
exemplify the kinds of advocacy that constitutional lawyers will engage in
before legislative and administrative officials. 33
Nonlegal materials play a large role in constitutional decisionmaking.
Constitutional law texts, by discounting the importance of such materials,
send the wrong message. To become successful constitutional advocates,
law students need to recognize the importance of nonjudicial forces in the
shaping of constitutional values. The inclusion of constitutional politics,
empirical studies, policy analyses, and editorial commentary in casebooks
will contribute to that recognition.
MORE INTERESTING. The constitutional law class is significantly enlivened by the in~roduction of nonjudicial materials. These materials serve as
a tangible benchmark against which Supreme Court decisions can be
understood. Students will be better equipped to debate what should
constitute a suspect class when they are familiar with a range of materials on
the causes and consequences of homosexuality. Likewise, Marbury seems far
less mysterious when viewed as a work of political strategy. Further, the
inclusion of nonjudicial materials reassures students who have never
studied government in college by providing all students in the class with a
common base of information. Students are less likely to be intimidated by
the Supreme Court, their classmates, or their professor when they are all on
equal footing. Finally, when played against the backdrop of politics,
empirical study, policy analysis, and editorial commentary, the constitutional law class becomes more vital and more urgent. Departinent of
Defense guidelines governing press coverage of the Persian Gulf War and
the related commentary of affected journalists improves class discussion on
prior restraints. Similarly, the battle between the FCC and Congress over
diversity preferences helps focus classroom discussion on the costs and
benefits of affirmative action.s4

***
The inclusion of substantive nonjudicial materials makes the constitutionallaw class more accurate, more useful, and more interesting. Yet, as
Baker and Viator correctly observe, constitutional law texts limit themselves
to Supreme Court decisions, academic commentary, author notes and

32. See, e.g., Curt Suplee, Brain May Dictate Sexuality; Node Seen as Key to Gay
Orientation, Wash. Post, Aug. 30, 1991, at Al.
33. Paul Brest attaches a more noble label to this process, namely, "constitutional
citizenship." Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 Clev. St. L. Rev. 175 (1986). For Brest,
"If the classical idea of citizenship has any bearing on constitutional decisionmaking in our
own time, it must be through a political discourse that recognizes the diversity of interests of
a heterogeneous society and the inevitability of representative government." Id. at 192.
34. Fisher & Devins, supra note 4, at 283-302.
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questions, and little else. Until casebook authors shake their belief that
Supreme Court cases are the stuff of the constitutional law class, the current
scheme will persist.
This Correspondence suggests that it is time to change the constitutional law course. To accomplish such change, casebooks will have to forego
some edited decisions in order to provide a more complete view of how
constitutional decisionmaking develops. 35 Yet, at the same time, Supreme
Court decisions should remain the centerpiece of the constitutional law
course. Students do need to learn constitutional doctrine and most of this
doctrine comes from the Supreme Court. Students also need to understand
the importance of precedent-based constitutional advocacy.
Cases are not enough, however. Constitutional decisionmaking often
extends beyond the court room to legislative committees and administrative
. agencies. Constitutional litigation, moreover, often hinges on policy arguments. The tradeoff of case materials for nonjudicial materials is therefore
appropriate; it will reflect the shaping of constitutional values more
accurately than a Court-centered approach. That it is also more useful and
more interesting should make this tradeoff irresistible.

35. Doug Laycock, criticizing the inefficiency of the case method in law school instruction,
has effectively argued that casebook editors should replace some case material with expository
text in order to make way for substantial excerpts from nonlegal sources. Douglas Laycock,
Reflections on Two Themes: Teaching Religious Liberty and Evolutionary Changes in
Casebooks, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1642, 1652-54 (1988). Admittedly, the choice of which cases to
cut and which nonjudicial sources to add is extraordinarily difficult. But the critical importance
of nonjudicial materials to the constitutional law course suggests that casebook editors at least
try to innovate their texts.
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